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DUALITY AND INFERENTIAL SEMANTICS
Abstract. It is well known that classical inferentialist semantics runs into
problems regarding abnormal valuations [? ? ? ]. It is equally well known
that the issues can be resolved if we construct the inference relation in a
multiple-conclusion sequent calculus. The latter has been prominently devel-
oped in recent work by Greg Restall [? ], with the guiding interpretation that
the valid sequent Γ L ∆ says that the simultaneous assertion of all of Γ with
the denial of all of ∆ is incoherent. However, such structures face significant
interpretive challenges [? ? ? ], and they do not provide an adequate grasp on
the machinery of the duality of assertions and denials that could (a) provide an
abstract account of inferential semantics; (b) show why the dual treatment is
semantically superior. This paper explores a slightly different tack by consid-
ering a dual-calculus framework consisting of two, single-conclusion, inference
relations dealing with the preservation of assertion and the preservation of
denial, respectively. In this context, I develop an abstract inferentialist se-
mantics, before going on to show that the framework is equivalent to Restall’s,
whilst providing a better grasp on the underlying proof-structure.
1. Introduction
1.1. Weaknesses of inferential semantics. Typically, model-theoretic conse-
quence is thought to delineate the correctness of inference because it is (in some
sense) reducible to the categorical notion of truth-preservation. In rough:
β is derivable from α1, α2...αn whenever β is a logical consequence
of α1, α2...αn..
In the Bolzano-Tarski tradition, this is typically thought of as follows. If Γ is a
theory of L , and V is a semantic structure (typically thought of as a model) for
L , then V is a model of Γ: V Γ if, for every α ∈ Γ, V α. And, α is a
logical consequence of Γ (Γ α) if, for every model V of Γ, V α. Inferential
derivability, on the other hand, is usually understood as derivability in a formal
system (sequent calculus; natural deduction; Hilbert system), where Γ L B is valid
in a formal system L, whenever B can be derived from Γ by means of the axioms
and inference rules of L.
Then, soundness and completeness ensure that the proof-theory is both correct
(according to the semantics), and that it is also strong enough to prove any valid
argument. The inference structure gives us epistemic access to validity in the form
of proofs, derivable sequents, and so on. But, so the thought goes, we require
the semantic structure to tell us where the counter-models are, lest we attempt
1
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an invalid proof. So-called paradoxical connectives such as “tonk” [? ] provide
grist to the mill for this order of priority. Given this, there is a residual feeling
that we are not able to provide an account of “real” validity limited to inferential
structures alone.1 In relation to classical logic at least, this feeling is well-supported
by the issue that, in standard single-consequence classical inference structures (such
as natural deduction), the rules defining ∨ and ¬ fail to characterise the classical
truth-functions [? ? ]. Take ∨ as example, with the rule R∨ as follows:
α ∨Iα
α ∨ β
β ∨Iβα ∨ β
α ∨ β
[αu]
σ
[βv]
σ ∨Eu,vσ
Consider this rule in relation to the generalised notion of a semantic structure
given below.
Definition 1. (Semantic structure) Define a semantic structure as an ordered pair
〈S, V 〉, where S is the enumerable set of formulas in a language L , and V is a
valuation space representing a structure of admissible valuations on the language.2
Then, let, V = {1, 0} be a set of truth-values. A valuation v is a function on L
assigning a truth-value ∈ V to a formula α ∈ S, where v : S → {V}.
Semantically, it is usual to say that that the classical semantic structure VCPL is
recursively induced by the truth-conditional interpretation of each piece of logical
vocabulary. In other words, VCPL contains those valuations that obey the classical
truth-conditional clauses for the connectives, which, in most cases, is equivalent to
taking those valuations recursively induced by the defined truth-functions for the
connectives. However, from an inferentialist point of view, we might look for the
set of valuations which are consistent with a set of inferential rules such as R∨. In
rough, by consistent, I mean any valuation v which satisfies an inference Γ L α
(in an inference structure L) so that v(α) = 1 whenever v(Γ) = 1, and that v is
consistent with a rule R iff v satisfies the conclusion of R whenever v satisfies the
premises.
1Stephen Read [? ] sums up this view:
What is good about the notion of proof-theoretic validity is that it recognises
that what rules one adopts determines the meaning of the logical terms involved
and commits one to accepting certain inferences as valid. What is bad is to
infer from this that those inferences really are valid. Proof-theoretic validity
serves an epistemological function to reveal how those inferences result from the
meaning-determining rules alone. But it cannot serve the metaphysical function
of actually making those inferences valid. Validity is truth-preservation, and
proof must respect that fact.
2See [? ? ].
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The issue for R∨ arises for cases in which v(α) = v(β) = 0 for Eu,v. In this
case, we can not ensure that v(α ∨ β) = 0 since we are able only to conditionally
infer σ from α∨β, given independent sub-derivations to σ (which will not figure in
the immediate sub-formulas of complex formulas involving ∨). We do not have in
schematic form all of the relevant information encoded within the immediate sub-
formulas involved in the derivation, so we can not construct, from Eu,v, a sequent
of the form 〈Γ, α〉. Given that we are concerned here only with formally valid
reasoning, what Eu,v tells us is just that, if there are proofs available from α to σ
and β to σ, then we have (classically) proofs of (α ⊃ σ), and (β ⊃ σ). With these,
and the disjunction elimination rule we only have that (α∨β), (α ⊃ σ), (β ⊃ σ) L σ.
So, the rules are compatible with non-standard valuations, in which v(α) = v(β) = 0
whilst v(α ∨ β) = 1.
The failure occurs for this form of inferentialism because it has no machinery for
dealing with falsity, so we require appeal to the resources of semantics in order to
account for the invalidity of sequents. In other words, it looks as though we need
some sort of model-checking device to deal with refutation (or falsity). One way
of thinking about this is that there is a division of labour between an inferential
structure, which is well equipped to provide epistemic traction on the validity of
argument, and a semantic structure, which is capable of providing counterexamples.
To clarify, we then expect that for every formula α:
Either ∃Γ+(Γ+ L α) or, ∃V (V α).
Then, for some agent A, concerned with α, A may ask (i) is α valid in an
inference structure L?; (ii) is there a countermodel to α in a semantic structure V ?
The thought here is that we are required to appeal to V in order to account for the
possible countermodels to a possibly valid formulas, since, L is incapable of this,
by itself.
1.2. Possible solutions. It is well known that this unwanted feature does not
carry over to multiple-conclusion inference structures, such as Gentzen’s LK. The
obvious reason for this, which is brought to the fore in Restall’s recent work [? ],
is that these structures provide for a symmetrical way of dealing with proofs and
refutations, or asssertion and denial. Restall’s approach is connected to a wider
body of literature in which inference structures are considered to be constitutive
of normative constraints over the coherence of agents’ commitments [? ? ? ]. For
example:
[I]nferential rules do not prescribe what ought to be done, but what
is allowed and what is not allowed to do when one asserts or judges
that p. Inferential rules do not primarily consist in commands,
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obligations or incentives for speakers or believers; they rather con-
strain our linguistic practices by delimiting what, on an inferential
point of view, we may and may not do by entertaining conceptual
contents. [? ]
On this view, a valid inference in L is understood to be a constraint upon the
coherent assertion and denial of sentences. For example, an agent asserting α,
β L α∧β, may be said to be rationally committed to not simultaneously asserting
α, β and denying α∧ β. Importantly, this view takes logical consequence to tell us
not just about assertion, but about both assertion and denial, where denial is taken
to be conceptually prior to negation. Restall proposes an inferentialist account
of the classical sequent calculus in these terms: If Γ ∆, then it is incoherent
to assert all of Γ, and deny all of ∆. As is clear, dealing with assertion and
denial symmetrically is also reflected in the symmetrical construction of the sequent
calculus.3 A construction which allows sets of formulas to appear on either side of
lends itself to the view of inferential rules as providing pragmatic constraints
over legitimate combinations of sentences.
However, there are several issues with such multiple-conclusion structures, which
are well documented in the relevant literature. The most prominent of these is that
they fail to adequately capture the structure of ordinary argument, which is a key
desiderata for the inferentialist. Steinberger [? ] puts this as follows:
Principle of answerability: only such deductive systems are per-
missible from the inferentialist point of view as can be seen to be
suitably connected to our ordinary deductive inferential practices.
As suggested above, this principle does not amount to an over-simplistic identi-
fication of inference rules with actual ordinary language practice, since these are
also taken to be normative constraints on the coherence of assertions and denials.
Nonetheless, the basic structure of inference is one that is typically construed in ar-
gument form from (possibly) multiple premises, and a single-conclusion. As Rumfitt
[? ] has it;
[...] the rarity, to the point of extinction, of naturally occurring
multiple-conclusion arguments has always been the reason why
mainstream logicians have dismissed multiple-conclusion logic as
little more than a curiosity. (79)
Restall’s account, and his brand of inferentialism, goes some way to alleviating
these concerns. Even so, there is a deeper point that these arguments from ordi-
nary practice allude to which has to do with the lack of any independent account
3Though Peregrin, for example, does not follow suit: ‘[Γ L α] is much more reasonably construed
as a constraint: the exclusion of the possibility to deny α when one has asserted Γ’ [? , p.3].
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of assertion or denial. For instance, intuitionism provides an account of the assert-
ibility conditions for a set of formulas, with the general condition that a formula α
is assertible whenever there is a proof of α. Treating denial symmetrically suggests
the need for an account of the deniability conditions for a set of formulas, perhaps
with the general condition that a formula α is deniable whenever there is a refu-
tation of α. This would then be in keeping with the inferentialist motto that the
meaning of a logical constant consists in its assertibility conditions, together with
its deniability conditions. But, pursuing this kind of project requires a rather differ-
ent approach to Restall’s, since his notion of the coherence of assertions and denials
would then be derivative of these explanatory structures. To this end, I pursue this
project in an abstract setting, by first defining an inference structure consisting
of a dual-calculus of assertions and denials whose inference relations are both in
single-conclusion form. I then go on to develop a generalised approach to inferen-
tial semantics, which illuminates the expressive superiority of this approach to the
multiple-conclusion structure, though the two are shown to be structurally equiv-
alent. To finish, I return to Restall’s concern with classical inference structures,
showing that, in fact, Restall’s account can be better put in terms of a dual-calculus
of intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic. In essence, if we pair intuitionistic logic
with its dual, then we get a form of constructively classical logic which is profitably
interpreted in a Nelson-style semantics.
2. Duality and coherence
2.1. Proof and refutation structures. Consider a proof in some inference struc-
ture L, Γ L α as showing that the combined assertion of Γ ∪ α is coherent.
This follows from the typical definition of closure under the inference relation L :
α ∈ Γ ↔ Γ L α. Equally, we can consider a refutation in the dual structure LD,
α LD Γ as showing that the combined denial Γ ∪ α is coherent. Again, we can
define closure under this dual relation LD : α ∈ Γ ↔ α LD Γ. We can also think
of this pair of inference relations as determining a complete inference structure,
where now L = 〈S, L , L 〉. Then, L preserves the set of coherent assertions, Γ+,
and L preserves the set of coherent denials, ∆
−. So, we can define a refutation
inference, α L ∆, to be interpreted as showing that whenever all of ∆ is deniable,
α is deniable also (in L).
The account of refutation given in the following closely follows those given in [?
? ? ? ? ], whilst the abstract account of inference structures follows that given in
[? ].
Definition 2. (Inference structure) Define an inference structure L as an ordered
pair, 〈S, L 〉, where S is as above, and L is a binary derivability relation between
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a subset of formulas of S (denoted (Γ,∆)), and formulas of S, (denoted (α, β)), so
L⊆ P(S)×S.4 A sequent in L is an ordered pair 〈Γ, α〉 where Γ is a set of formulas
and α a single formula (and Γ ∪ {α}).
We say L is normal when the following conditions hold, for all formulas, α, β ∈ S,
and all subsets Σ,∆ ⊆ S:
(R) : α L α
(M) : Σ L α implies Σ,∆ L α
(T) : If Σ L α for each α ∈ ∆, and Σ,∆ L β, then Σ L β.
Definition 3. An arbitrary relation on S, L⊆ P(S)× S is finitary, where, for all
Γ, α ∈ S, if Γ L α, then there is a finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ where Γ′ L α.
Definition 4. (Inference rule) An n-premise rule R in L is an n + 1-ary relation
on the sequents of L. Where a rule is associated with a connective #, the set
of formulas will be closed under the operation #(α1, ..., αn), such that, when all
(α1, ..., αn+1) ∈ #, (and {α1, ..., αn} ⊆ S), αn+1 ∈ S.
A set of inference rules, by defining a basic set of inferences also establish a wider
set of inferences over the formulas of S. The rules of a proof-theory thus constrain
L by defining the set of formulas closed under the derivability relation. The closure
of a set of formulas under rules R and the structural constraints above tells us that
when α is provable from Γ by means of R, then it is the case that either there
is a sequence α1, α2, ..., αn, where αn = α and each αi ∈ {α1, ...αn−1} is either
an element of Γ, or there is some ∆ L αi ∈ R where ∆ ⊆ {α1, ...αi−1}. This
requires that L is finitary, but that demand follows from the the requirement that
a good proof-system should be finitary given that it is an essential part of ordinary
reasoning that it is finitary.
Call a logic L that is constrained in this way, proof-theoretically defined, when L
distributes S onL in terms of the collection of sequents that are provable according
to L.
Definition 5. Any sequent 〈Γ, α〉 ∈ L is L-valid, then Γ L α.
In foregrounding the notion of proof, we are interested in the conditions under
which α is is provable given a set of assumptions Γ, thus allowing for a highly non-
trivial account of the assertibility of α in the context of the set of assumptions Γ.
The dual notion of refutation is, for our purposes at least, simple to define.
4Obviously, we are working with a formal language here, so we probably don’t strictly need to use
the phrase “well-formed formula” (wff) of L . I should flag up that I interpret the phrase quite
liberally, allowing, for example “{φ|...}” to be a wff .
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Definition 6. (Duality) The dual of Γ L α is α LD Γ (for any Γ ⊆ S, α ∈ S).
Definition 7. (Dual inference structure) Define a dual inference structure LD as an
ordered pair, 〈S, LD 〉, where S is as above, and L is a binary derivability relation
between a formula and a subset of formulas of S, so LD ⊆ S×P(S).5 Say that LD
is normal when it is reflexive, transitive, monotonic and finitary (the definitions
given for L carry over striaghtforwardly). A sequent in L is an ordered pair 〈α,Γ〉
where Γ is a set of formulas and α a single formula (and Γ ∪ {α}). The definition
of inference rules also carries over, bearing in mind the reversal of LD .
Then, 〈S, LD 〉 is a refutation structure for 〈S, L 〉 when, for any non-theorem
of 〈S, L 〉, ∅L α, then α LD ∅. In foregrounding the notion of refutation, we are
interested in the conditions under which α is is refutable given a set of (denied)
assumptions Γ, thus allowing for a highly non-trivial account of the deniability of
α in the context of Γ.
The relation between the two structures is simpler with the following definition:
Definition 8. (Closure) Say that a theory Σ ⊆ S is L -closed, for some L, when,
for all Σ L α, α ∈ Σ. Say that a theory Θ ⊆ S is LD - closed for some LD, when,
for all α LD Θ, α ∈ Θ.
Letting Γ+ denote the set of L-valid formulas, and ∆− the set of LD-valid formu-
las, we say that 〈S, LD 〉 is a refutation structure for 〈S, L 〉 whenever ∆− = S \Γ+.
That is to say, whenever ∆− is equivalent to the set of non-derivable formulas for
L. Then, we can think of a sequent with an empty l.h.s, ∅ L α, as indicating that
an agent may coherently assert α under any circumstance; dually, we can think of
a sequent with an empty r.h.s, α L ∅, as indicating that an agent may coherently
deny α under any circumstance. With this in mind, the coherence constraint over
the relationship between L and L is the following.
Corollary 9. (Coherence) For no atomic formula α ∈ S is it the case that ∅ L α
and α L ∅ whenever L , L are normal.
This is equivalent to Restall’s suggestion that we interpret validity in terms of
the preclusivity of an agent A simultaneously asserting α and denying α under any
circumstances. With this in place, we can define the combined inference structure:
Definition 10. (Combined inference structure) Define a combined inference struc-
ture LC as an ordered triple, 〈S, LC , LC 〉 satisfying the conditions given above.
5Obviously, we are working with a formal language here, so we probably don’t strictly need to use
the phrase “well-formed formula” (wff) of L . I should flag up that I interpret the phrase quite
liberally, allowing, for example “{φ|...}” to be a wff .
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We can also give the following natural constraint over the combined inference
structure:
Definition 11. (Totality) Say that a combined inference structure LC is total
whenever, for any formula α, either ∅ LC α or α LC ∅, and for no α is it the case
that both ∅ LC α and α LC ∅.
2.2. Multiple-conclusion inference structures. Before developing an abstract
approach to inferentialist semantics in the context of combined inference structures,
we pause to note their relation with multiple-conclusion structures.
Definition 12. (Multiple-conclusion inference structure) We define a multiple-
conclusion inference structure LM as an ordered pair, 〈S, LM 〉, where S is the
enumerable set of formulas in a language L , and LM is a binary derivability
relation between a subset of formulas of S (denoted (Γ,∆)), and a subset of formulas
of S, such that LM ⊆ P(S)×P(S), (elements of S are single wff ’s denoted (α, β)).6
A sequent is an ordered pair 〈Γ,∆〉 where Γ,∆ are sets of formulas of S. As usual,
we write a sequent as Γ LM ∆.
Say that LM is normal when the following conditions hold for all formulas,
α, β ∈ S, and all subsets Σ,∆,Γ,Θ ∈ S:
(R) : Γ ∩∆ 6= set then Γ LM ∆
(M) : Σ LM ∆ implies Σ,Γ LM ∆,Θ
(T) : If Γ, α LM ∆ and Γ LM α∆ then Γ LM ∆.
Furthermore, say that an inference structure is finitary, when, for all Γ,∆ ⊆ S,
if Γ LM ∆, then there are finite subsets Γ
′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆ where Γ′ LM ∆′.
Proposition 13. The relational product of the closure of S under LC and LC is
a multiple conclusion inferential structure 〈S, LM 〉.
To see why this is the case, recall the definition of closure under inference rules
given above. We first show that, whenever Γ LC α, Γ LM α, which requires only
that the multiple-conclusion versions of R,M, T preserve the first derivation. If
Γ is empty then this is obvious, as is the case where α ∈ Γ. Then, we say that
the multiple-conclusion relation LM contains the corresponding relation LC , since
Γ LC β iff Γ LM {β} for Γ ∈ P(S), and β ∈ S. Similarly, α LC ∆ iff {α} LM ∆
for ∆ ∈ P(S), and α ∈ S. These are the least single-conclusion relations contained
in the multiple-conclusion relation LM [? ]. Consider the case in which Γ LC α,
and, by definition, α LC Γ is a refutation in LC , to check T . Say that Γ1, β LM α
and Γ2 LM β where Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2. By induction, we have α LM Γ1 ∪ β and
6I use the non-standard notation LM rather than LM both to note their difference, and also
because later I shall show the equivalence between these structures and the combined inference
structure.
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β LM Γ2 as refutations in LM . Assume that ∅ LM α. Then, either (a) ∅ LM β, or
(b) ∅ LM θ, for some θ ∈ Γ1. For (a), it is obvious that ∅ LM θ, for some θ ∈ Γ2,
so, in either case we have that ∅ LM θ for some θ ∈ Γ, which obeys the definitions
given in [? ] of least single-conclusion relations.
However, this does provide us with a slightly different interpretation of multiple-
conclusion inference structures, that, nonetheless is entirely compatible with Re-
stall’s.
Definition 14. (General coherence) A pair of sets of formulas 〈Γ,∆〉 is coherent iff
Γ∩∆ 6= ∅, then Γ L ∆. A pair of sets of formulas 〈Γ,∆〉 is incoherent iff Γ∩∆ = ∅,
then ΓL ∆.
Then, given the way in which we have constructed a multiple-conclusion structure
as the relational product of a combined inference structure, we can read any sequent
Γ LM ∆ (rewritten α1, ..., αn LM β1, ..., βm) as: either α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn L βi (where
βi is some formula in ∆), or αi L β1 ∧ ... ∧ βm (where αi is some formula in Γ).
We can render the above relation more perspicuous if we consider the construc-
tion of bipartitions over the set of formulas S, which is also the first step in the
construction of a semantic structure as determined by an inference structure. The
following purposefully combines proofs in terms of multiple-conclusion inference
structures with combined inference structures in order to clarify their relationship.
Definition 15. (Closure) Say that a theory Σ ⊆ S is LM -closed, for some L,
when, for all 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ L, ∆ ∩ Σ 6= ∅ whenever Γ ⊆ Σ.
Theorem 16. (Coherence extension) 〈Γ,∆〉 is coherent, so Γ LM ∆, iff (i). For
any extension, Γi, of Γ, there exists an atomic element α ∈ ∆, such that Γi =
Γ ∪ {α}; (ii). For any extension, ∆i, of ∆, there exists an atomic element β ∈ Γ,
such that ∆i = ∆ ∪ {β}; (iii). For every 〈Γ,∆〉, there exists maximal extensions
〈Γ′,∆′〉 such that {Γ′} ∪ {∆′} = ∅, so Γ′LM ∆′.
We can think of these maximal extensions as bipartions (for LM ), 〈Γi,∆i〉, where
Γi

LM
∆i, and ∆i is the complement of Γi. We will go on to show that the subset
Γi ⊆ S is closed iff Γi is closed under LC , and the complement ∆i is closed under
LC
for any LC , which determines LM .
Lemma 17. For a finite normal multiple-conclusion inference structure LM (equiv-
alently a combined inference structure LC), and for any pair of theories 〈Γ,∆〉 (in
S), where Γ

LM
∆, there exists a bipartition extending 〈Γ,∆〉 to Γ′, and its comple-
ment, ∆′, where ∆′ =df ∀α /∈ Γ′, with Γ′ ∪∆′ = S, and Γ′ ∩∆′ = ∅.
Proof. Take the enumerable formulas of S, {α1, α2...αi, αi+1}, and any Γ,∆ for
which Γ

LM
∆, and construct the following chain of pairs of theories:
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i. 〈Γn,∆n〉 = 〈Γ,∆〉
ii. 〈Γn+1,∆n+1〉 =
〈Γn ∪ {αi+1} ,∆n〉 if (Γn LM ∆n, αi+1)〈Γn,∆n ∪ {αi+1}〉 if (Γn, αi+1 LM ∆n)
The limit of this construction is:
〈Γ′〉 = ⋃
n∈′
Γn, and 〈∆′〉 =
⋃
n∈′
∆n.
The pair 〈Γ′,∆′〉 form a bipartition over formulas of S, with Γ′LM ∆′. Then,
(by the fact that L is finitary), for any subsets of 〈Γ′,∆′〉, we have ΓLM ∆, when
Γ ⊆ Γ′, ∆ ⊆ ∆′. 
So, we can construct an arbitrary bipartition (for L) recursively as:
〈Γi,∆i〉 iff, for all α ∈ S
α ∈ Γi when 〈Γi LM α,∆i〉
α ∈ ∆i when 〈Γi, α LM ∆i〉.
This requires that, at every stage of the construction, Γi keeps track of the set
of formulas that are derivable from Γ, and ∆i the set of propositions being such
that ∆ is derivable from them. So, we think of an arbitrary bipartition 〈Γi,∆i〉, Γi
as denoting a complex set of coherent assertions in the context of that bipartition
(given L), and ∆i a set of coherent denials. To render this perspicuous, we will
denote the bipartition 〈Γ+,∆−〉 in what follows. The addition of an atomic to a
stage of the construction of a bipartition indicates that the agent takes a settled
stance towards it. Then, from the point of view of the combined inference structure
LC , which determines LM , for a pair of subsets of formulas 〈Γ,∆〉 and an atomic
formula α, it must be the case that either Γ LC ∆, α or Γ, α LC ∆. The first tells
us what it is possible to assert on the assumption that we already assume Γ to be
assertible, and the latter, what it is possible to deny on the basis of assuming ∆ to
be deniable.
With this in mind, we have the following result.
Lemma 18. If ∅ LC α for all α ∈ Γ, and β LC ∅ for all β ∈ ∆, then ΓLM ∆.
And, if Γ

LM
∆, then ∅ LC α for all α ∈ Γ, and β LC ∅ for all β ∈ ∆.
Proof. The proof is fairly obvious by the above definition of bipartitions, so I show
just one instance. Assume that ∅ LC α for all α ∈ Γ and β LC ∅ for all β ∈ ∆,
but Γ LM ∆. It follows that ∅ LC αi, in which case, Γ \ αi LC αi,∆ (by M),
and, clearly, Γ \αi, αi LM ∆. Then Γ \αi LM ∆ (by T ). But, by the definition of
bipartitions, we have {Γ \ αi ∪∆} ⊆ {Γ ∪∆}, so Γ \αiLM ∆. Conversely, suppose
that Γ

LM
∆, but either ∅
 
 
LC
α for some α ∈ Γ, or β
 
 
LC
∅ for some β ∈ ∆. Then,
either α LC ∅ for some α ∈ Γ, or ∅ LC β for some β ∈ ∆, (in which case Γ LM ∆
(by M). 
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3. From Inference Structures to Semantic Structures
We now turn to discuss inferentialist semantics. First, recall from the introduc-
tion the view that for every atomic α ∈ S:
Either ∃Γ+(Γ+ L α) or, ∃V (V α).
As we saw, a standard inference structure is not strong enough to dispell the
requirement of appeal to the right hand side. However, in the context of a combined
inference structure (equivalently a multiple-conclusion inference structure), this is
no longer the case since we have a combined structure of proofs and refutations
which provide the means to account for refuted formulas without appeal to model
theory. Crucially, by the definition of bipartitions, we know that, at any stage of
their construction where 〈Γi,∆i〉 ⊆ 〈Γ+,∆+〉, we have Γi∩∆i = ∅, and so ΓiLM ∆i;
for any α ∈ Γi, α  LC ∅, and vice-versa.
Then (to get ahead of ourselves), we can think of each stage of the construction
as constituting a partial interpretation where the formulas of Γi are mapped to the
valuation {1} in a semantic structure, and the formulas in ∆i to {0}. To clarify
further, we can now rewrite the above so that, for every atomic α ∈ S;
Either ∃Γ+(Γ+ LC α) or, ∃∆−(α LC ∆−).
Thus, the proposition that we want is this:
Proposition 19. Say that Γ LM ∆ is correct on a bipartition 〈Γ+,∆−〉 iff either
some α ∈ Γ is in ∆−, or some β ∈ ∆ is in Γ+. Equivalently, either α LC ∆−, or
Γ+ LC β.
Lemma 20. For a multiple-conclusion inference structure LM defined as above,
there exist (maximal) bipartitions 〈Γ+,∆−〉 such that, for every α /∈ Γ+, α ∈ ∆−,
and, where every α /∈ Γ+ (equivalently, α ∈ ∆−), α LC ∅, and, every α ∈ Γ+,
∅ LC α.
Proof. Again, the proof is fairly obvious by the construction of bipartitions. We
know already that, if Γ+ is closed under LM , then Γ+ = S \ ∆−. Then, for any
α /∈ Γ+, we have α LM ∅, (equivalently α LC ∅). For this, just note that, if
Γi ⊆ Γ+, then ∆i+1 ∩ Γ+ 6= ∅, where ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪ {α} so either α ∈ Γ+, or
∆i ∩ Γ+ 6= ∅. If the former (α ∈ Γ+), then Γi ∪ α ⊆ Γ+, so ∆i ∩ Γ+ 6= ∅. Suppose,
instead that Γ+ is closed under LM , but Γ+ is not maximal. Then, there must be
some theory Γi ⊃ Γ+ (also closed under LM ), where there is a formula α ∈ Γi \Γ+.
But, since Γi is closed under LM , Γi ⊆ Γ+ and so α /∈ Γi. 
Lemma 21. Any finite normal multiple-conclusion inference structure (equiva-
lently, combined inference structure) is sound and complete with respect to its max-
imal bipartitions.
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Proof. First, define the subset of maximal bipartitions of S that is determined by
an inference structure L as B(L) =
{
〈Γ+,∆−〉 : Γ+LM ∆−
}
. Then, suppose that
Γ

LM
∆. We know, by the above, that, for any Γ ⊆ Γ+ and ∆ ⊆ ∆−, ΓiLM ∆i.
This gives us completeness. For soundness, consider some Γ LM ∆, to show that
there is no B ∈ B(L) for which Γ ⊆ Γ+ and ∆ ⊆ ∆−. Suppose otherwise, then,
since Γ+

LM
∆−, by M, we have Γ

LM
∆, contrary to our assumption.
It is simple to see that this gives us proposition 19. Take an arbitrary sequent,
〈Γ,∆〉, which we rewrite as {α1, ..., αn} LM {β1, ..., βm}. Then, 〈Γ,∆〉 is valid
for a logic LC when (α1 LC ∆
− or α2 LC ∆
− or...αm LC ∆
−) or (Γ+ LC
β1 or Γ+ LC β2 or...Γ
+
LC
βm). Then, Γ LM ∆ is correct on the partition
〈Γ+,∆−〉 iff either some α ∈ Γ is in ∆−, or some β ∈ ∆ is in Γ+. 
3.1. Semantics and Galois connections. It is simple to define the set of truth-
value assignments that are consistent with an inference structure L to be the set of
characteristic functions associated with its maximal bipartitions. In the following,
since we dealing with bipartitions we will assume that V = {1, 0}. Then, we define
the characteristic functions for bipartions as follows.
Definition 22. (Characteristic function) For any relatively maximal theory, Γ′, we
take a valuation to be the characteristic function of Γ′ such that:
v(Γ′) = {v ∈ U : v(α) = 1 for each α ∈ Γ′};
and, for the complement
v(∆′) = {v ∈ U : v(αi) = 0 for each αi ∈ ∆′}.
Lemma 23. For a set of valuations V ⊆ U , with a valuation v defined over for-
mulas α ∈ S as {v ∈ U : α→ {1, 0}}, v(α) = 1 ↔ ∅ LC α, v(α) = 0 ↔ α LC ∅;
and Γ LM ∆ iff either, there is some α ∈ Γ and v(α) = 0, or there is some β ∈ ∆
and v(β) = 1.
Proof. On the above construction, we have defined maximal bipartitions over S,
〈Γ+,∆−〉, where Γ+ ∪∆− = S, and Γ+ ∩∆− = ∅. We show that the set of such
valuations V is consistent with L. Suppose otherwise, then there must exist two sets
of formulas, Σ,Φ, with Σ LM Φ, and, for some v ∈ V , v(Σ) = 1 whilst v(Φ) = 0.
In other words, on the above construction, it must be that Σ ⊆ Γ+, whilst Φ ⊆ ∆−,
whilst Σ L Φ, but this contradicts the construction of maximal bipartitions. 
We can go further than this by noting that the relation between valuation spaces
and logics induces a Galois-connection [? ? ? ? ]. Formally, we define the map
sending L → V , denoted V(L) =df Γ L ∆ : ∀v ∈ V(L) {v(Γ) = 0 or v(∆) = 1}.
In the other direction, the map V → L, denoted L(V ) =df v ∈ V : ∀〈Γ,∆〉 ∈
L {v(Γ) = 0 or v(∆) = 1}. Then, the pair {L,V} form an antitone Galois connec-
tion between the power-set of U , and the power-set of L, both ordered by inclusion.
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The following assumes that any inference structure is in the form of either LM or
LC . This in hand, it is simple to define closure operations over:
(P1): The set of all valuation-spaces V ⊆ U on L , ordered by set-inclusion;
(P2): The set of all inference structures L ⊆ L′ on L , ordered by set-inclusion.
Definition 24. Define a closure operator cl as a function on the posets 〈V,L〉,
where cl obeys the following clauses for all x, y on 〈V,L〉:
(c1) x ≤ cl(x)
(c2) cl(cl(x)) ≤ cl(x)
(c3) x ≤ y → cl(x) ≤ cl(y)
This ensures that, where cl is a closure operator on a poset 〈P,≤〉, and x is an
element of P , then x is closed iff cl(x) = x. In our context, this gives us an abstract
completeness theorem over 〈V,L〉.
Fact 25. For each V ⊆ U and L ⊆ L′ (for some S):
L ⊆ L(V(L))(3.1)
V ⊆ V(L(V ))(3.2)
L ⊆ L′ ⇒ V(L′) ⊆ V(L)(3.3)
V ⊆ U ⇒ L(U) ⊆ L(V )(3.4)
Proof. Given at length in [? ]. 
(1.5) indicates that when we determine V(L), and then induce an inference struc-
ture L from the valuation space determined, then L will contain L. Similarly, (1.6)
tells us that, when we determine L(V ), and then determine a valuation space V
from the inference structure determined, that V will contain V . With this, we can
formulate abstract soundness and completeness theorems, which, following Dunn
and Hardegree [? ], we call absoluteness.
Fact 26. [? ] For any L, V ;
• L is absolute iff L = L(V(L))
• V is absolute iff V = V(L(V )).
Proof. By the fact that L, V form a Galois map, and the definition of Galois closure
(c1-3). 
Resultantly, we can give general soundness and completeness theorems.
Corollary 27. In general, for any semantic structure V ⊆ U , built-up as above,
V = V(L(V )).
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Proof. [? , p.200] We prove contrapositively by defining a valuation v0 /∈ V (in
order to show that v0 /∈ V(L(V ))). Then define T = {α ∈ S : v0(α) = 1} and
F = {α ∈ S : v0(α) = 0}. For any v ∈ V , v 6= v0, so either v(α) = 0 for some α ∈ T
or v(α) = 1 for some α ∈ F . Then v satisfies T L F , and it follows that T L F is
correct on V . But, by definition, v0 refutes T L F , so v0 /∈ V(L(V )). 
The above tells us that our combined (or multiple-conclusion) inference struc-
tures and semantic closure are two sides of the same coin. In effect, this is precisely
what we knew at the start of this investigation with respect to classical multiple-
conclusion inference structures being capable of dealing with non-standard valua-
tions. Now, however, we have both an abstract account of this, and also a better
grasp on its machinery through the purely inferential characterisation of a combined
proof and refutation structure.
4. Duality for Restall’s Classical Structure
Let us now return to Restall’s characterisation of classical inferential structures in
this context. Recall that our guiding desiderata with respect to the above interpre-
tation of multiple-conclusion inference structures in terms of combined structures of
proofs and refutations was that the notion of coherence in Restall’s account looks to
be derivative of that of proof and refutation. If we consider the multiple-conclusion
inference structure characterised by LK in terms of its internal duality, we may
prise it apart into a combined structure. However, rather than letting the rela-
tion LC be characterised by a set of classical rules, we can, in fact, construct LC
by means of the intuitionistic structure LJ , which simply limits the structure of
sequents to single-succedents. For LC , we can do precisely the opposite by limit-
ing the structure of sequents to single-antecedents in the co-intuitionistic structure
LDJ , though, as above, since we are thinking of LC as a refutation structure this
also amounts to limiting to single-succedents.
We briefly sketch the details, closely following the presentation found in [? ]. I
assume familiarity with the sequent calculus LJ , and present the {∧,∨,¬} fragment
of LDJ below:
α Γ
(∧L1)
α ∧ β Γ
β Γ
(∧L2)
α ∧ β Γ
θ Γ, α θ Γ, β
(∧R)
θ Γ, α ∧ β
DUALITY AND INFERENTIAL SEMANTICS 15
α Γ β Γ
(∨L)
α ∨ β Γ
θ Γ, α
(∨R1)
θ Γ, α ∨ β
θ Γ, β
(∨R2)
θ Γ, α ∨ β
Γ, α
(¬L)
¬α Γ
α Γ
(¬R)
Γ,¬α
We interpret these, as above, in terms of providing conditions on the refutation
of formulas. So, for example, a refutation of α∧ β consists of a refutation of α or a
refutation of β; a refutation of α ∨ β consists of a refutation of α and a refutation
of β; a refutation of ¬α consists of a proof of α.
Remark 28. In fact, negation can be interpreted in various ways, particularly if we
develop LDJ to include co-implication as Urbas [? ] does.7 However, since we are
interested in the interaction between the two structures here, and we already have
the constraint that, for any α, either α is provable in LJ or refutable in LDJ , it
seems sensible to say that a refutation of ¬α in LDJ consists of a proof of α in LJ .
So, we will use negation to “tie” the two structures together to retain the coherence
of the combined structure.
Definition 29. Define the duality between the proof and refutation structures
defined by LJ and by LDJ with the mapping d:
αd : α
(∅ α)d : α ∅
(α ∧ β)d : αd ∨ βd
(α ∨ β)d : αd ∧ βd
(¬α)d : ¬(α)d
We record the following without proof.
Theorem 30. The mapping d is an involution such that αdd = α. Moreover, d is
an isomorphism such that if Γ LJ α, then α
d
LDJ Γ
d [? ].
Theorem 31. The structure 〈S, LJ 〉 contains the same counter-theorems as 〈S, LK
〉. The structure 〈S, LDJ 〉 contains the same theorems as the structure 〈S, LK 〉.
Proof. The proofs for both are well-known, typically under the titles Glivenko’s
theorem and Dual-Glivenko’s theorem, respectively [? ]. 
With this in hand, we have the following result.
7I do not consider implication and co-implication here for the sake of brevity.
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Theorem 32. The combined inference structure 〈S, LJ , LDJ 〉, interpreted as a
proof and refutation structure, is exactly equivalent by theorems and counter-theorems
to the multiple-conclusion inference structure 〈S, LK 〉.
Proof. Obvious by Theorem 30. 
Even with these brief comments, we are now in a position to see that there
is a significant benefit in splitting apart the structure defined by LK. First, we
have a clear account of the conditions under which coherent assertion and denial
is derivative of an underlying structure of proofs and refutations. Restall’s account
of the incoherence of certain assertions and denials can be understood in terms
of the conditions upon proofs and refutations in intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic
inference structures, respectively.
In addition, because of the way in which we have developed the approach to
inferentialist semantics, there is a fairly natural interpretation of the combined in-
ference structure in terms of a Nelson-style model, which reflects something of the
constructive nature of the resultant, nonetheless classical, structure. It is natural
to construct a Nelson-style structure, for the reason that it allows us to be per-
spicuous regarding the equal weighting given to proofs and refutations, assertions
and denials, truth and falsity. In essence, the construction follows exactly that of
the abstract account given above, bearing in mind the constraint given there that,
at any stage of the construction of bipartitions, for some α under consideration at
that stage, it is either the case that ∅ LJ α, or α LDJ ∅ .
Definition 33. Define the semantic structure determined by 〈S, LJ , LDJ 〉 as
V = 〈S,≤, V +, V −〉. In relation to the abstract account given above, we are now
explicitly thinking of V as the collection of “stages” of the process of construc-
tion of bipartitions, ranging over the domain of formulas S. V +, V − indicate the
collection of positive and negative characteristic valuations, respectively (these cor-
respond precisely to Γ+ and ∆− above). We will also use ≤ to indicate that the
structure forms a poset on S, which is obvious from the above proofs. Then, let
+ and − denote satisfaction and refutation, respectively, and si indicate a stage
of the construction where i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 34. By the above interpretation of the refutation structure defined by
LDJ , and the corresponding structure of proofs for the structure defined by LJ ,
we can “read off” the following semantic conditions on V:
(1) si + α iff α ∈ (V +, si)
(2) si − α iff α ∈ (V −, si)
(3) si + (α ∧ β) iff α ∈ (V +, si) and β ∈ (V +, si)
(4) si − (α ∧ β) iff α ∈ (V −, si) or β ∈ (V −, si)
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(5) si + (α ∨ β) iff α ∈ (V +, si) or β ∈ (V +, si)
(6) si − (α ∨ β) iff α ∈ (V −, si) and β ∈ (V −, si)
(7) si + (¬α) iff α ∈ (V −, si)
(8) si − (¬α) iff α ∈ (V +, si)
The conditions are straightforward. For example, (1) simply indicates that α is
satisfied at stage si iff α belongs to the set of assertible formulas at that stage. The
negation conditions are natural, reflecting the idea that negation “swaps” a formula
between proofs and refutations.
Definition 35. At any stage si, we have V +(α) = {α ∈ S : si + α}; V −(α) =
{α ∈ S : si − α}. We define the relationship between stages in terms of ≤, where
s1 ≤ s2 iff s2 + α,∀α ∈ (V +, s1) and s2 − α,∀α ∈ (V −, s1).
Theorem 36. Then, ≤ is a partial order that is reflexive, monotonic and transitive.
Proof. Reflexivity is obvious, since si ≤ si for every si. For transitivity, assume that
s1 ≤ s2 and s2 ≤ s3. Then, ∀α ∈ (V +, s1), s2 + α and ∀α ∈ (V −, s1), s2 − α,
and ∀α ∈ (V +, s2), s3 + α and ∀α ∈ (V −, s2), s3 − α. Consider the case where
α ∈ (V +, s1), so s2 + α, and s2 ∪ s3 + α (by M). Applying T to each side yields
s3 + α. The proof for α ∈ (V −, s1) is analagous. For monotonicity, assume that
α ∈ (V +, s1), and s1 ≤ s2, so s2 + α, and α ∈ (V +, s2). Assume α ∈ (V −, s1),
then s2 − α, and α ∈ (V −, s2). 
This property of monotonicity is important since it highlights that the construc-
tion is constructible for both V + and V −:
If s1 ≤ s2 then ∀α ∈ (V +, s1), α ∈ (V +, s2); and ∀α ∈ (V −, s1), α ∈ (V −, s2).
This ensures that, whenever a formula is given a valuation at a stage, that
valuation remains at every stage upstream, so, if s1 + α, then s2 + α; if s1 − α,
then s2 − α.
Resultantly, we have a classical structure which is, nonetheless, constructive
(over both truth and falsity). For example, if we interpret the above in terms of
the set of stages of reasoning over time, in which each stage represents the addition
of information, then, the addition of that information will not alter the underlying
set of information. The proofs given above show that this can be extended to a
bipartition over the entire domain S. This difference is subtle, but nonetheless
provides us with a far greater grasp on the internal machinery of the inferential
semantics.
4.1. Further work. The previous section, in particular, is suggestive of further
work that will be pursued in this vein. For example, throughout, we have made two
substantive assumptions regarding the combined inference structure which allows
that structure to be equivalent to a multiple-conclusion structure. The first was
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that the set of formulas are allowed to interact freely in the structure. Further
work might pursue structures in which the two are restricted in their interaction,
perhaps by techniques such as polarization. The second was that the two structures
are coherent throughout. In further work, I intend to develop structures which are
paracoherent, in the sense that they allow for a limited form of incoherence in
specific cases. It is likely that these two areas should be developed in tandem.
